The White House gives a clinic on co-opting reporters today in the Washington Post analysis piece by Peter Baker and Dan Balz. Ostensibly the piece is an analysis of the White House communications strategy, which during the Clinton administration was referred to as spin.
In reality, it's just a "Back Spin" piece, where the administration gives the appearance of access and candor in order to co-opt the reporters into their new message. In this case, it's NSC adviser Peter Feaver giving the Post the back door slider by guiding them to which poll questions on Iraq are important.
Feaver and Gelpi categorized people on the basis of two questions: "Was the decision to go to war in Iraq right or wrong?" and "Can the United States ultimately win?" In their analysis, the key issue now is how people feel about the prospect of winning. They concluded that many of the questions asked in public opinion polls -- such as whether going to war was worth it and whether casualties are at an unacceptable level -- are far less relevant now in gaging public tolerance or patience for the road ahead than the question of whether people believe the war is winnable.
Oh, I see the questions where the numbers don't look good for aren't important, maybe we'll stop asking those questions, or put disclaimers on them next time we report them. Then there's this piece of malarkey:
The more resolute a commander in chief, the Bush aides said, the more likely the public will see a difficult conflict through to the end. "We want people to understand the difficult work that's ahead," said a senior administration official who insisted on anonymity to speak more freely.
The Bush administration is stuck on this "test of wills" idea, but with the strains on our military and the recruiting problems we're having it is starting to look like a war of attrition.
The Bushies were never willing to face up to the costs of winning the war, such as expanding the size of the army and raising taxes to pay for it. Instead, they were intent on flying below the radar screen of the American public and portraying a aura of victory, afraid any change in course would look weak.
If they spent as much time trying to win in Iraq as they do re-fighting the propaganda wars of Vietnam, we'd be in much better shape.